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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                      
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 We are confronted in this case with a tension between 
two issues of critical constitutional concern:  the need to 
protect the confidentiality of jurors' deliberations while, at 
the same time, guaranteeing the right of the press and the public 
to have access to court proceedings.  We conclude that under the 
circumstances presented here, the district court improperly 
sealed the transcript of the jury voir dire and then upon 
unsealing it, placed certain improper restrictions on the use of 
the juror-identifying information.  We will, therefore, reverse 
the order of the district court sealing the record, and we will 
reverse in part and affirm in part the restrictions imposed by 
the district court on the conduct of juror interviews. 
 This appeal arises from several high-profile criminal 
prosecutions for securities fraud, RICO conspiracy, mail fraud, 
and related charges.  Appellants, the Associated Press, the New 
Jersey Press Association, and the Newark Morning Ledger Company 
  
(collectively, "the press"), challenge the actions of the 
district court first in sealing the transcript of the jury voir 
dire at the end of the trial and, later, in releasing the 
transcript with restrictions placed upon its use.  The 
restrictions apply to anyone coming into possession of juror-
identifying information from the transcript; they circumscribe 
the substance and extent of any questioning of the former Antar 
jurors.     
 We find that the sealing of the transcript was 
accomplished prematurely.  It was done without adequate notice, 
without a hearing, and without factual findings being placed on 
the record.  We further find that the restrictions imposed on the 
use of juror information at the time of the unsealing were not 
supported by an actual or potential threat either of juror 
harassment or of invasion of the deliberative process as it was 
taking place. 
 We do not minimize the importance of confidential jury 
deliberations or of the need to protect former jurors from 
harassment.  Nor do we intend to suggest that the restrictions 
which we find to have been improperly imposed here may not be 
permissible in some future case.  In order to restrict the right 
of access, however, a court must carefully articulate specific 
and tangible, rather than vague and indeterminate, threats to the 
values which the court finds override the right of access.   
  
 There are, of course, instances when the jurors' 
identities should be concealed in order to protect against 
tampering or coercion or threats.  See, e.g., In re Globe 
Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 97 (1st Cir. 1990).  Moreover, 
harassment of jurors by the press after the completion of a trial 
may adversely affect the willingness of citizens to freely 
participate in the jury system.  This court has not yet, however, 
faced the question of restricting access to court proceedings or 
to transcripts of those proceedings in order to protect the 
jurors' from post-trial contact with the press.   
 Under the circumstances presented in this case, we 
conclude that the precedent of Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior 
Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 104 S.Ct. 819 (1984) ("Press-
Enterprise I"), is directly controlling.  We hold, therefore, 
that the presumptive right of access applied to the voir dire 
proceedings as they were recorded in the trial transcript.1  
Applying the requirement that detailed findings of the need for 
restrictions be made before any restriction is imposed, we find 
that the court's initial order, sealing the transcript, violated 
procedural and substantive aspects of the press's right of access 
to the voir dire transcript.2  The subsequent release of the 
                     
1
.  The parties agree that there was a contemporaneous right of 
access to the courtroom at the time of the jury voir dire. 
2
.  To the extent that Judge Rosenn in his thoughtful concurring 
opinion differentiates "specific" from "detailed", we are not 
persuaded that the difference is significant.  Our conclusions, 
as are his, and the discussion that follows from our conclusions 
are based on the precedent of Press-Enterprises I and its 
  
transcript was not a cure for this violation of access.  
Moreover, certain of the restrictions placed upon the use of the 
information in the transcript, contained in the court's second 
order unsealing the transcript, were too broad in view of the 
lack of any specific recorded findings of actual or imminent 
threat of juror harassment. 
 
  I. 
 A.  The Trial and the Sealing of the Transcript 
 The six week trial in this criminal action began on 
June 1, 1993.  The defendants, founders of a well-known consumer 
electronics chain, Crazy Eddie's, were accused of various corrupt 
business practices, including a scheme of securities fraud.   
 Because of pre-trial publicity, the district court 
requested a large pool of potential jurors.  As a result, on the 
first day of trial, there were not enough seats in the courtroom.  
Before starting the voir dire examination of the potential 
jurors, the court asked that members of the press leave the 
courtroom in order to free up additional seats.  This appears to 
have been a request rather than an order.  The press voluntarily 
complied.  The voir dire continued for two additional days.  
(..continued) 
progeny, including United States v. Raffoul, 826 F.2d 218 (3d 
Cir. 1987) and United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 
1994).  We also share with Judge Rosenn his concern about the 
burden we place upon the district courts.  However, we believe 
that what we have required is consistent with Press Enterprises I 
and its progeny. 
  
During that period, the members of the petit jury stated their 
names and hometowns on the record.  Although the voir dire was an 
"open" proceeding, in that the courtroom was not closed to non-
participants, the absence of the members of the press at the 
court's request prevented them from learning the identities of 
the Antar jurors. 
 The press was present during the remainder of the 
trial.  Toward the end of the trial, on the day that summations 
were given and the jury retired, Richard P. O'Leary, counsel for 
the Associated Press ("AP"), sent a letter to the court, 
requesting the names and addresses of the jurors.  Joint Appendix 
("App.") at 203-04.  O'Leary sent the letter because the AP hoped 
to interview the jurors after the verdict.  The combination of 
the press's absence from the voir dire and the fact that the 
record of the proceedings had not yet been transcribed left the 
press in a curious position.  Though the names of the jurors were 
public information and anyone present during the voir dire might 
know their identities, the press did not.  In his letter, O'Leary 
noted the news organization's interest in speaking to members of 
the jury after the conclusion of the trial.  He attempted to ease 
any concerns the court might have had about potential contacts 
with the jurors prior to the conclusion of deliberations by 
stating:  "As an officer of the court, I represent that I would 
not disclose this information to the AP until after the verdict 
has been returned."  Id.  
  
 The court's response to O'Leary's request was to 
immediately seal the transcript of the voir dire proceedings and 
other portions of the public record containing juror identifying 
information.  This was done sua sponte:  no hearing was held and 
no findings were made.3   
 B.  The Post-Sealing Hearings 
 Four days later, on July 20, 1993, the jury returned 
its verdicts, convicting Eddie Antar and Mitchell Antar of 
multiple counts of securities fraud.  The AP then moved to 
intervene in order to obtain the release of the jurors' names and 
addresses.  In the meantime, the district court had not dismissed 
the jury because of a pending civil forfeiture action against the 
Antars.  However, on August 2, two days before the jury was to 
reassemble, the government moved to dismiss the forfeiture 
action.  The court granted the dismissal and agreed that it would 
discharge the jurors by telephone, rather than requiring them to 
return to the courthouse.  Because the jurors were not physically 
present, the press were unable to approach them at the conclusion 
of their jury service. 
 At the same time, the court raised the issue of the 
AP's motion to intervene.  Counsel for the AP reiterated the 
                     
3
.  The only documentation of the closure appears in the district 
court's docket sheet.  Entry #94 reads in part:  "Ordered minutes 
of 6-3-93 and transcript sealed until further order of court. . . 
. F[iled] 7-16-93."  App. at 8. 
  
press's interest in obtaining the jurors' names and addresses so 
that they could be interviewed.  The district judge responded: 
 I'm very interested in that issue.  I'm a bit 
baffled by it, to be perfectly frank with 
you, because everything we do in this system 
of justice is designed to protect the secrecy 
of the jury proceedings. 
App. at 106.   
 The AP countered by arguing that the First Amendment 
established a right of access to jury voir dire proceedings.  In 
keeping with its concerns, the court replied that it would 
require the press to rebut a presumption that communications with 
jurors may be limited in order to ensure free and confidential 
jury deliberations in the future. 
 We got a collision.  We got some First 
Amendment collision with that rule [Fed. R. 
Evid. 606(b)].4  We got a collision with the 
whole jury system here.  I mean . . . you 
folks are going to have the laboring oar 
                     
4
.  Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides: 
 (b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment.  
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or 
indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or 
statement occurring during the course of the jury's 
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or 
any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the 
juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or 
indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes 
in connection therewith, except that a juror may 
testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial 
information was improperly brought to the jury's 
attention or whether any outside influence was 
improperly brought to bear upon any juror.  Nor may a 
juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the 
juror concerning a matter about which the juror would 
be precluded from testifying be received for these 
purposes. 
  
here.  I'll tell you that.  I'll give you a 
hearing, obviously.  You have a laboring oar 
with me to show me . . . what, if any, 
prevailing news gathering or First Amendment 
arguments are sufficient to overcome the very 
sacred nature of a jury's deliberations.   
 
 It would seem to me--I'm just talking flat 
out.  What are you going to ask the jury?  
How did you vote?  What did your fellow 
jurors think?  What evidence impressed you? 
 
 These are all things which fall squarely 
within the proscriptions of that rule.  I 
can't call them to testify as to that. 
 
App. at 107.  
 The judge then voiced his reluctance to release the 
identities of the jurors because of his concern about the growing 
trend of jurors in high-profile cases to discuss their 
deliberations post-trial.  He expressed his concern in stating: 
 All of a sudden, the minute they finish their 
job, you send them outside and the press can 
go asking them about their feelings about the 
case?  How did you vote in the case?  
 
 This sensationalism has got to stop some 
place.  We have to get back to our system of 
justice. . . . There is something radically 
wrong if we're trying cases in the press. 
 
App. at 110. 
   The district judge's focus on Rule 606(b) is evident 
from his comments.  The judge indicated that this rule helps to 
promote secrecy, which, in turn, promotes the health of the 
deliberative process.  He emphasized his belief that the 
limitations of Rule 606 apply equally to press interviews as they 
  
do to investigations into the validity of a verdict:  "I'm stuck 
on question number one, which is what can you ask a juror which . 
. . does not fly in the face of what 606(b) talks about?"  App. 
at 113. 
 While the above concerns applied to the continued 
sealing of the transcripts, the judge also explained why he 
believed the initial closure order to have been necessary:   
 I sealed it all [the transcript and court 
documents containing juror-identifying 
information] because I wasn't going to have 
my ruling subverted, hopefully.  I sealed 
everything. 
 
 . . . 
 
 The purpose of my gag order was very simple.  
It was to get back to the very basic and 
fundamental issue of having a jury not 
affected by any outside influences, including 
the outside-of-the-court statements made by 
counsel for the government or for the 
defense. 
 
 I've accomplished my purpose.  Absolutely. 
App. at 124.   
 In concluding, the judge explained that he would be 
calling the jurors later that day to discharge them and that he 
would "strongly suggest, in view of their duties, that they not 
discuss the matter with the press at least insofar as their 
deliberations are concerned."  App. at 117.  The judge cautioned 
the press that they should not contact the jurors pending a final 
decision, even if they were to come across the jurors' identities 
through legitimate means.  "I would recommend that they await 
  
this Court's ruling. . . . If they want to take me on, be my 
guest. . . . [I]t might be considered inappropriate to go ahead 
and try to do some investigative work on the jury in the interim 
before you have intervened in the proceeding."  App. at 119-120.  
At the end of the hearing, the judge scheduled argument for 
August 23 on the questions of intervention and of the release of 
the jurors' identities.  The argument date was subsequently 
postponed to October 18.    
 The Newark Morning Ledger Company and the New Jersey 
Press Association then joined the AP in the motion to intervene.5  
After full briefing of the issues, at the October 18, 1993, 
hearing, the district judge permitted the interventions.  He also 
reiterated his concerns about protecting the jury deliberation 
process: 
 You're talking about invading the jury room. 
. . . You're going to ask them what the 
deliberations were about, what was important, 
what was unimportant, who voted for what, was 
there a split on this. 
 
                     
5
.  In addition, defendant Eddie Antar addressed the issue before 
the district court, arguing in favor of release of the voir dire 
transcripts.  Letter from David W. Fassett, Esq. to Judge 
Nicholas H. Politan (Aug. 26, 1993), App. at 208-212; Transcript 
of Proceedings, October 18, 1993, App. at 184-86.  Antar based 
his argument upon the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
to a public trial, suggesting that this right mandated disclosure 
of all sealed transcripts.  In particular, he relied upon Waller 
v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210 (1984), as well as this 
court's findings that subsequent public access to transcripts 
helps to fulfill the constitutional purpose of an open trial, 
United States v. Smith, 787 F.2d 111, 114 (3d Cir. 1986).  Antar 
has not raised this issue on appeal, and we see no need to 
address it here.    
  
 . . .  
 
 That is what you gentlemen are espousing.  
You gentlemen are espousing opening that door 
and letting the public know everything that 
goes on in the deliberative process under the 
guise of the First Amendment.  Not for the 
purpose of  . . . doing some analytical study 
of the juror, but to sell a newspaper, sir.  
That's all you're looking to do.  Sell 
newspapers.  Don't ever forget it. 
App. at 144-45.  The judge further questioned whether there could 
be any "valid public interest" in learning, after the fact, about 
jury deliberations in a criminal case. 
 C.  The District Court Opinion 
 The transcripts remained under seal until December 13, 
1993.  On December 9, 1993, the district court issued its order 
and opinion unsealing the records, to become effective four days 
later.  United States v. Antar, 839 F.Supp. 293 (D.N.J. 1993). 
 In its opinion, the district court quickly disposed of 
the matter of the initial sealing.  The court explained that the 
AP's letter requesting the jurors' names and addresses had caused 
immediate concern by raising the possibility that the press would 
interfere with the jurors prior to their rendering a verdict.  In 
response, "the court found it necessary to exercise its broad 
discretion in supervising the fair administration of justice," 
and so it sealed the transcripts and other court records 
containing juror-identifying information.  Id. at 298. 
 The court then turned to consideration of whether the 
transcripts should now be unsealed.  The court characterized the 
  
press's claim of access as an "assertion of a right to invade the 
secret deliberations in the jury room."  Id. at 296.  In 
analyzing whether the press possessed a legitimate claim to the 
voir dire transcripts, the court framed the issue as whether the 
press had a First Amendment right of access to the jurors 
identities.  Examining this potential "right of access to jurors' 
identities," the court found that, (1) historically, the 
identities of jurors have been known to the community, and (2) 
such knowledge promotes the values of openness, fairness, and the 
perception of fairness in the criminal justice system.  Turning 
to the fact that access to jurors' identities facilitates post-
verdict interviews by the press, however, the court found that 
this practice "bodes ill for the continued vitality and 
authoritativeness of the jury system," id. at 302, and suggested 
that "the need for secrecy of jury deliberations is fundamental 
to the tradition of justice."  Id. 
 The court, then, recognized two compelling, if 
competing, interests.  Historical practice and values weighed in 
favor of open recognition of jurors' identities; weighing against 
disclosure was the "compelling societal and governmental interest 
in maintaining the secrecy of the jury deliberative process and 
protecting jurors from harassment, judgment and/or punishment 
after rendering a verdict."  Id. at 303.  Of primary concern to 
the court was the likelihood that probing jury deliberations 
  
would discourage free and open exchange during the deliberative 
process: 
 Common human experience dictates that one's 
candor may be compromised when one fears that 
his or her thoughts and comments . . . may be 
revealed to the public immediately upon 
rendering a verdict and being discharged. 
Id. at 304.6   
 The court determined that the "fair administration of 
justice" required it to make an accommodation between the two 
interests, balancing each, rather than promoting one at the 
expense of the other.  As such, the court ordered the unsealing 
of the voir dire transcripts and other public documents but 
placed restrictions upon "any person" who might seek access to 
the information contained therein. 
 The court imposed four limitations on juror contacts by 
"any person who comes into possession of the transcript of the 
juror voir dire and the juror identifying information contained 
therein . . .."  The first restriction, "(a) no juror is under 
any obligation to grant an interview nor may any juror be 
compelled to do so," is consistent with the routine instructions 
customarily given to jurors in the federal court system.  See 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Handbook for 
Trial Jurors 11 (1991).  839 F.Supp at 295. 
                     
6
.  Specifically, in the text of its order, the court held that 
"Providing unfettered access to the press and the public in 
general . . . presents a substantial threat to the administration 
of justice by endangering the deliberative process."  Id. at 295. 
  
 Though the court made no mention of actual or 
threatened harassment of the jurors in this case, it described 
the next two limitations as protecting the jurors from 
harassment.  These limitations restricted the manner in which the 
Antar jurors might be approached and interviewed: 
 (b) repeated requests of a juror for an 
interview are strictly prohibited; 
 
 (c) once a juror expresses a desire to 
conclude an interview already in progress, 
that interviewer must immediately cease all 
questioning[.] 
 
Id.  In fact, the court recognized that it was imposing these 
restrictions as a preemptive, rather than reactive, step, to 
protect the jurors "should the members of the press become 
overzealous in their quest for that which they have no particular 
right to know."  Id. at 305.   
 The fourth limitation was addressed to the interest in 
maintaining the confidentiality of the jury deliberations.  It 
provided that  
 (d) no inquiry may be made into the specific 
votes, statements, opinions or other comments 
of any juror during deliberations other than 
the juror being interviewed. 
 
This also is consistent with the provisions of the federal 
Handbook for Trial Jurors, which instructs federal trial jurors 
that "the court may enter an order in a specific case that during 
any such interview, jurors may not give any information with 
respect to the vote of any other juror."  Id. at 11.  Commenting 
upon the fourth restriction, the district judge acknowledged, 
  
however, that the effect of the restriction upon the press' 
inquiry was somewhat illusory:  "If a juror freely chooses to 
disclose such information, so be it.  This Court, unfortunately, 
is powerless to prevent such happenstance."  839 F.Supp. at 305.  
This fourth limitation, then, inhibited only certain disclosures, 
i.e., only those solicited by others, rather than those initiated 
by a juror himself or herself.   
 The district judge summed up his justification for this 
final restriction, stating:  
 The restriction[] serve[s] to guard against a 
future juror's reluctance to openly share his 
or her opinions for fear that those opinions 
will be revealed by fellow jurors to all 
inquiring minds. 
Id. at 306.   
 Finally, the court's opinion set out the provisions of 
a letter to be sent to the jurors simultaneously with the release 
of the court's opinion and order.  Id. at 306-08.  The letter 
explained to the jurors that their names and addresses were being 
unsealed, and it warned that they might be contacted by members 
of the press.  The court noted that each juror had "a right to 
talk to anyone about any aspect of the case, if you so choose."  
Id. at 308.  The court, however, asked the jurors to keep the 
views of the court in mind when dealing with the press.  In 
particular, the court advised: 
 This tradition of secrecy is a hallmark of 
the jury system. . . . Accordingly, I suggest 
to you that our jury system functions better 
if jurors continue to respect the privacy of 
  
the jury room after their deliberations have 
concluded. 
Id.  The letter ended with a recitation of the limitations 
imposed in the court's order.   
 The press responded to the order by filing this timely 
appeal.   
  
 II. 
 A. 
 The district court had jurisdiction over the underlying 
criminal prosecutions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  Under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291, we have appellate jurisdiction to review final 
decisions of the district court.  We have previously noted that 
orders either granting or denying access to portions of a trial 
record are appealable as a final orders pursuant to § 1291.  
United States v. Raffoul, 826 F.2d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 1987); 
Smith, 787 F.2d at 113.     
 The existence of statutory jurisdiction does not settle 
the question, however.  Under Article III, § 2 of the 
Constitution our ability to exercise judicial power extends only 
to live cases and controversies.  The court's December 9 order 
currently affects the rights of the parties, so it presents such 
a case.  At first glance, however, the July 16 sealing order 
appears to have been mooted by the December 9 order because the 
transcripts have, in fact, been unsealed.  On that issue, no 
  
meaningful relief remains to be granted, and an opinion on the 
matter would appear to be advisory in nature.   
 We believe, however, that the court's sealing of the 
voir dire falls within that class of cases which are "capable of 
repetition, yet evading review."  Southern Pacific Terminal Co. 
v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 
283, (1911).  See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 
478 U.S. 1, 6, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 2739 (1986) ("Press-Enterprise 
II").  The "capable of repetition" doctrine is a narrow exception 
to the mootness principle, appropriately limited to cases 
satisfying the following two requirements: 
 (1) the challenged action was in its duration 
too short to be fully litigated prior to its 
cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the same 
complaining party would be subjected to the 
same action again. 
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 349 
(1975)(per curium).  See also Dia Navigation Co. v. Pomeroy, _ 
F.3d _ (3d Cir. 1994).  
 In cases such as this, involving the presumptive right 
of access to the stages of a criminal proceeding, a prohibition 
on access is tied in some fashion to the ongoing proceeding.  As 
such, it typically is of short duration and could easily evade 
review.  Cf. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 
102 S.Ct. 2613 (1982).  Based on the court's post hoc rationale 
of protecting the jury during its deliberations, the court could 
have unsealed the transcripts in a matter of days, once the 
  
verdict had been returned.  It did not do so for five months.  
However, the fact that the court has now lifted a ban that was 
improperly imposed should not work to preclude appellate review.  
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 488 U.S. 555, 563, 100 
S.Ct. 2814, 2820 (1980) ("This Court has frequently recognized . 
. . that its jurisdiction is not necessarily defeated by the 
practical termination of a contest which is short-lived by 
nature"). 
 The government, however, argues against application of 
the "capable of repetition" exception on the ground that the 
scenario of this case is unlikely to recur.  True, it is unusual 
that the crowding of a courtroom during voir dire will leave the 
members of the press out in the corridor, where they will not 
learn the identities of the jurors.  Nonetheless, what is 
important is that these parties not again be denied their right 
of access to otherwise public transcripts without first receiving 
the procedural and substantive protections that are prerequisite 
to such exclusions.7  Accordingly, we will address the merits, 
after a brief foray into the standard of review. 
                     
7
.  This court has consistently found a reasonable likelihood of 
recurrence to exist in situations involving denial of press 
access to criminal proceedings and transcripts.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 836-37 (3d Cir. 
1994)(closure of post-trial examination of jurors not moot though 
proceedings concluded and transcript released); Raffoul, 826 F.2d 
at 222 (closure of courtroom during defendant's testimony not 
moot though proceedings concluded); United States v. Criden, 675 
F.2d 550, 554 (3d Cir. 1982)("Criden II")(sealing of pre-trial 
hearing transcript not moot though proceeding concluded and 
transcript publicly available).  Cf. United States v. A.D., _ 
F.3d _, _ n.1 (3d Cir. 1994)(closure of juvenile detention and 
  
 B. 
          We exercise plenary review in determining whether the 
district court applied the proper legal principles first in 
sealing the transcript and later in unsealing it with 
limitations.  Simone, 14 F.3d at 837; Smith, 787 F.2d at 113 (3d 
Cir. 1986).  As a matter of course, we review the fact-finding of 
the district court with substantial deference, reversing only for 
clear error.  Fed. R. Civ. P.52(a).  In the First Amendment 
context, however, the Supreme Court has recognized the duty of 
reviewing courts to engage in an independent factual review of 
the full record.  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
285, 84 S.Ct 710, 728 (1964).8  Thus we have explained that when 
(..continued) 
delinquency proceedings, and sealing of transcripts, not moot 
despite fact proceedings already concluded).  In particular, the 
court has taken notice of the fact that "certainly the press and 
public will continue to seek access to criminal trials," Raffoul, 
826 F.2d at 222, with the prospect that the press may be subject 
to wrongful closure or sealing orders in the future.   
 
8
.  See also Bose Corp. v. Consumers, 466 U.S. 485, 498-502, 104 
S.Ct. 1949, 1958-60 (1984).  In Bose, the Court was concerned 
with an apparent conflict between the seemingly limited scope of 
review established by F. R. Civ. P. 52(a) and the "independent 
factual review" required by New York Times v. Sullivan.  The 
Court found the rules to be compatible, based in part upon a 
weaker presumption of accuracy given to findings of 
constitutional fact.  Specifically, the Court found a more 
rigorous factual review to be appropriate where the legal rule at 
issue "assigns an especially broad role to the judge in applying 
it to specific factual situations," where the rule is "given 
meaning through the evolutionary process of common-law 
adjudication," and where the constitutional values protected by 
the rule "make it imperative" that the rule is correctly applied.  
Id. at 502, 104 S.Ct. at 1960.  Accord United States v. Criden, 
648 F.2d 814, 817 (3d Cir. 1981)("Criden I")(finding that scope 
of "abuse of discretion" review "will be directly related to the 
  
we address a right of access claim, our scope of review is 
substantially broader than that for abuse of discretion.  "This 
broader review includes independent consideration of the district 
court's order and the factual findings inferred from the evidence 
before it."  In re Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 913 F.2d 89, 92 (3d 
Cir. 1990).  
 
 III. 
 A. 
 We believe that the district court lost sight of the 
requisites of access to court proceedings because of its concern 
for protecting the jurors and their deliberations from exposure 
by the press.  The issue of media access to jurors is a topic of 
vigorous debate, and the views of the district court, as set 
forth above, are well represented in the literature.9  Yet in 
(..continued) 
reason why that category or type of decision is committed to the 
trial court's discretion in the first instance."). 
9
.  On this debate, see, e.g., Abraham S. Goldstein, Jury Secrecy 
and the Media: The Problem of Postverdict Interviews, 1993 U. 
Ill. L. Rev. 295 (suggesting that jury's "authoritativeness" and 
its role as "guardian of community social-justice values" are 
threatened by public exposure, but arguing that best solution 
would come from legislature in form of statute prohibiting 
disclosure of deliberations, as this might support finding of 
compelling governmental interest overriding First Amendment right 
of access)(But see Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 
U.S. 596, 102 S.Ct. 2613 (1982) (requiring case-by-case, 
individualized findings of compelling interest before closure may 
be ordered and rejecting notion that legislative findings and 
enactment could support closure in all cases of a given class)); 
Robert L. Raskopf, A First Amendment Right of Access to a Juror's 
Identity: Toward a Fuller Understanding of the Jury's 
Deliberative Process, 17 Pepp. L. Rev. 357 (1990) (advocating a 
  
both of its orders--first sealing the transcript, and then 
limiting the use of the juror information--the court failed to 
make findings sufficient to justify its restrictions on access.  
By recasting the question posed as "whether the press has a right 
of access to the jurors' identities," the court obscured the 
central issue in this case:  the propriety of limiting the right 
of access sua sponte, without findings, and under the 
circumstances which existed both at the time of the sealing and 
at the time of the restricted unsealing. 
 Although the actions of the district judge served to 
deprive the press of the jurors' identities, this objective was 
accomplished by means of sealing the voir dire transcript.  Under 
the Supreme Court's First Amendment analysis, we must look 
objectively to that which was done and the means by which it was 
accomplished.  Then, we assess whether those actions comport with 
the substantive and procedural strictures established to 
vindicate the "freedom of speech, [and] of the press" guaranteed 
under the First Amendment.  As such, our analysis starts with the 
first action taken--the sealing of the voir dire transcript.   
 B. 
(..continued) 
right of access to jurors' identities and describing the 
educational and institutional benefits of juror interviews); 
Note, Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 
886 (1983)(recognizing that post-trial restrictions on access to 
jurors implicate First Amendment protections and suggesting that 
judges use persuasive, rather than prohibitive, techniques, such 
as judicial supervision of interviews and admonishment of jurors 
concerning the need to protect the secrecy and confidentiality of 
their deliberations).     
  
 The public right of access to voir dire proceedings in 
a criminal case is firmly established.  The Court's "right of 
access" jurisprudence began with Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100 S.Ct. 2814 (1980), in which the Court 
held that the First Amendment provides the public and the press 
with a right of access to criminal trials.10  The case involved a 
retrial in a murder prosecution that had been closed without 
findings or consideration of alternatives to closure.  Tapes of 
the proceedings were, however, released as soon as the trial 
concluded.  The Court found that criminal trials are covered by a 
"presumption of openness," id. at 573, 100 S.Ct. at 2825, so that 
closure of the proceedings may be justified only by an 
"overriding interest articulated in findings."  Id. at 581, 100 
S.Ct at 2829. 
 In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of 
California, 464 U.S. 596, 104 S.Ct. 819 (1984)("Press-Enterprise 
I"), the Court specifically addressed whether the guarantees of 
open public proceedings in criminal trials extend to the voir 
dire examination of potential jurors.  The Court held that they 
do.  Following its analysis in Richmond Newspapers, the Court 
based its finding of a right of access upon two primary 
considerations: (1) the lessons of historical practice, and (2) 
                     
10
.  448 U.S. at 576-77, 100 S.Ct at 2827 (plurality); 448 U.S. 
at 583-84, 100 S.Ct. at 2830-31 (Stevens, J., concurring); 448 
U.S. at 585, 100 S.Ct at 2831 (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J., 
concurring).  See also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 
U.S. 596, 603, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 2618 (1982). 
  
the beneficial value of open proceedings to the functioning of 
the judicial process and the government as a whole.  See Globe 
Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604-06, 102 S.Ct. at 2619.  This has 
become known as "the test of experience and logic."  Id. at 2620; 
Simone, 14 F.3d at 837.  In its historical survey, the Court 
found that jury selection has, since its inception, 
"presumptively been a public process."  Press-Enterprise I, 464 
U.S. at 505, 104 S.Ct. at 821.  With regard to institutional 
values, the Court concluded that "[o]penness . . . enhances both 
the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of 
fairness so essential to public confidence in the system."  Id. 
at 508, 104 S.Ct. at 823.  As such, the court held that the right 
of access clearly encompasses voir dire proceedings, so that 
closure "must be rare and only for cause shown that outweighs the 
value of openness."  Id.; 104 S.Ct. at 509. 
 The Court proceeded to set forth the standards to be 
applied in determining whether closure may be justified on the 
facts of a given case: 
 The presumption of openness may be overcome 
only by an overriding interest based upon 
findings that closure is essential to 
preserve higher values and is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest.  The 
interest is to be articulated along with 
findings specific enough that a reviewing 
court can determine whether the closure order 
was properly entered. 
Id. at 510, 104 S.Ct at 824.  See also Globe Newspaper Co., 457 
U.S. at 607, 102 S.Ct. at 2620 (describing test as requiring 
  
showing that closure is "necessitated by a compelling 
governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest").  These requirements have been restated unequivocally 
in each of the "right of access" cases since Richmond Newspapers.  
For example, in the case subsequently known as Press-Enterprise 
II, 478 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2735, the Court held that there is a 
right of access to preliminary hearings conducted pursuant to the 
California penal code.  At issue was an asserted conflict between 
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and the 
First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings.  Even 
while recognizing that the defendant has an absolute right to a 
fair trial,11 the Court emphasized the unyielding substantive and 
procedural protections that must be satisfied before a trial can 
be closed to protect that competing constitutional right: 
 [T]he proceedings cannot be closed unless 
specific, on the record findings are made 
demonstrating that closure is essential to 
preserve higher values and is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest.  If the 
interest asserted is the right of the accused 
to a fair trial, [a proceeding to which the 
right of access applies] shall be closed only 
if specific findings are made demonstrating 
that, first, there is a substantial 
probability that the defendant's right to a 
fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity 
that closure would prevent and, second, 
reasonable alternatives to closure cannot 
                     
11
.  In Press-Enterprise I the Court observed that "No right 
ranks higher than the right of the accused to a fair trial." 464 
U.S. at 508, 104 S.Ct. at 823.  See also, Richmond Newspapers, 
448 U.S. at 564, 100 S.Ct. at 2821 (describing the right to a 
fair trial as "superior").  
  
adequately protect the defendant's fair trial 
rights. 
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13-14, 106 S.Ct. at 2743 
(citations omitted).12  The Court concluded by suggesting that 
the mere assertion of a conflict between an established right of 
access and a societal or governmental interest--even another 
constitutional right--must not be used to defeat the right of the 
public and the press to open proceedings.  Rather, particularized 
findings must be made on the record in each case, (1) 
establishing the existence of a compelling governmental interest, 
and (2) demonstrating that absent limited restrictions upon the 
right of access, that other interest would be substantially 
impaired.  Id. at 15, 106 S.Ct. at 2743 (explaining that "[t]he 
First Amendment right of access cannot be overcome by the 
conclusory assertion that [open proceedings] might deprive the 
defendant of [the right to a fair trial]"). 
 Pursuant to Press-Enterprise I, then, there exists a 
presumptive right of access to voir dire proceedings.  This right 
                     
12
.  Furthermore, while the Court recognized the defendant's 
paramount right to a fair trial, it rejected the California 
court's analysis that closure may be justified on a mere finding 
of a "reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice."  Instead, 
the Court required a more stringent showing of "substantial 
probability."  In addition to strengthening the substantive 
proofs required, as an analytical matter, the Court rejected the 
state supreme court's approach of balancing the right to a fair 
trial against the right of access, reminding "these interests are 
not necessarily inconsistent. . . . One of the important means of 
assuring a fair trial is that the process can be open to neutral 
observers."  Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 7, 106 S.Ct. at 
2739.   
  
of access may not be abridged absent the satisfaction of 
substantive and procedural protections.  On the substantive side, 
a court ordering closure must first establish that the competing 
interest asserted is not only "compelling," but also that it 
outweighs the First Amendment right of access.  Second, it must 
determine that the limitations imposed are both necessary to and 
effective in protecting that interest.  One part of establishing 
the necessity of a limitation is a consideration of alternative 
measures and a showing that the limitation adopted is the least 
restrictive means of accomplishing the goal.  See A.D., _ F.3d _; 
Criden II, 675 F.2d 550.  On the procedural side, these 
determinations must be covered by specific, individualized 
findings articulated on the record before closure is effected.  
See Simone, 14 F.3d at 840; Raffoul, 826 F.2d at 226; Criden II, 
675 F.2d at 554, 560.   
 1.   
 In the case now before us, the government attempts to 
evade the implications of the above by suggesting that the actual 
voir dire proceedings were not closed.  True, no court order 
excluding non-parties was entered on the record.  Nonetheless, 
the court requested that the press leave the courtroom, thereby 
precluding them from obtaining information about the jurors.  The 
mere fact that the members of the press politely responded to a 
judicial request, rather than waiting to be compelled by an 
order, should not inure to their detriment. 
  
 That distinction aside, the fact that the courtroom was 
open during those three days in June is of little import, as we 
find that the right of access to voir dire examinations 
encompasses equally the live proceedings and the transcripts 
which document those proceedings.  See New York v. Chambers, 14 
Med. L. Rptr. 1919 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987)(right of access extends 
to voir dire transcripts, even where press has been present 
during open voir dire proceedings).  It is access to the content 
of the proceeding--whether in person, or via some form of 
documentation--that matters.13  Several factors compel this 
result. 
                     
13
.  We emphasize, however, that documentary access is not a 
substitute for concurrent access, and vice versa.  The right of 
access encompasses both forms, and both are vitally important.  
Thus, where a right of access exists, a court may not deny access 
to a live proceeding solely on the grounds that a transcript may 
later be made available.  Such a transcript would not fully 
implement the right of access because some information, 
concerning demeanor, non-verbal responses, and the like, is 
necessarily lost in the translation of a live proceeding to a 
cold transcript.  In Simone, 14 F.3d at 842, this court 
explained, 
 
 Because we have found the district court's 
findings in this case were insufficient to 
support closure, we cannot conclude that the 
release of the transcripts afforded adequate 
access in this case.  To do so would relax 
the standard for closure and would undermine 
one of the essential aspects of access by 
permitting public scrutiny of proceedings 
only at this later time. 
 
 Of course, where a court follows the procedure outlined 
above and finds that closure is necessary and effective to 
preserve an overriding interest, so that the right of access may 
therefore be temporarily limited, later release of a transcript 
  
 First, openness is ongoing--a status rather than an 
event.  At the heart of the Supreme Court's right of access 
analysis is the conviction that the public should have access to 
information; the Court never has suggested that an open 
proceeding is only open to those who are able to be bodily 
present in the courtroom itself.14  True public access to a 
(..continued) 
may be the next best means of implementing the right of access.  
Thus, for example, in Smith, 787 F.2d 111, this court held that 
the press and the public may be justifiably excluded from sidebar 
and in camera conferences.  However, we continued to explain 
that: 
 
 [I]f there has been no contemporaneous 
observation, the public interest in 
observation must be effectuated in the next 
best possible manner.  This is through the 
common law right of access to judicial 
records. 
 
Id. at 114-15.   
14
.  Specifically, though Press-Enterprise I involved closure of 
voir dire proceedings, neither the language nor the reasoning of 
that case suggest that the right of access should be construed to 
distinguish between concurrent access to live proceedings and 
later access to a written record.  The Court was concerned with 
information, not with a particular means of communication.  The 
Court wrote: 
 
 The value of [the open selection of jurors] 
lies in the fact that people not actually 
attending trials can have confidence that 
standards of fairness are being observed; the 
sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend 
gives assurance that established procedures 
are being followed and that deviations will 
become known. 
 
464 U.S. at 508, 104 S.Ct. at 823.  Similarly, public confidence 
is furthered by the knowledge that access to the proceedings is 
available at a later date via the transcript which is a public 
judicial record. 
  
proceeding means access to knowledge of what occurred there.  It 
is served not only by witnessing a proceeding firsthand, but also 
by learning about it through a secondary source.  In fact, 
recognition of the crucial role of secondary representation is 
the basis for the Court's protection of the rights of the media, 
who have been described by the Court as "functioning as 
surrogates for the public."  Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. 
at 574, 100 S.Ct. at 2825.15  Access to the documentation of an 
open proceeding, then, facilitates the openness of the proceeding 
itself by assuring the broadest dissemination.  It would be an 
odd result indeed were we to declare that our courtrooms must be 
open, but that transcripts of the proceedings occurring there may 
be closed, for what exists of the right of access if it extends 
only to those who can squeeze through the door?16 
   Furthermore, at the most basic level, the transcript 
at issue is a public judicial document, covered by a presumptive 
                     
15
.  The close connection between the rights of the public and 
the rights of the press has been widely observed.  In Nixon v. 
Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 609, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 1318 
(1978), the Court noted that the press "serves as the 
information-gathering agent of the public."  As such the First 
Amendment generally grants to the press no greater--and also no 
lesser--right to information about a trial than it does to the 
public at large.  See John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda 
Constitutional Law § 16.20 (4th ed. 1991). 
16
.  See Criden I, 648 F.2d at 822 (noting that "the public forum 
values emphasized in [Richmond Newspapers] can be fully 
vindicated only if the opportunity for personal observation is 
extended to persons other than those few who can manage to attend 
the trial in person."). 
  
right of access.  The Supreme Court, in Nixon v. Warner 
Communications, Inc., recognized an historically-based, common 
law right to inspect and copy judicial records and documents.  
435 U.S. at 597, 98 S.Ct. at 1312.  In fact, this long-
established17 common law right has played a crucial role in the 
development of First Amendment jurisprudence.  As the First 
Circuit has observed, "The common law presumption that the public 
may inspect judicial records has been the foundation on which the 
courts have based the first amendment right of access to judicial 
proceedings."  Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d. 1, 13 (1st 
Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).   
 This court has also noted that the common law right of 
access to transcripts helps to fulfill the openness of criminal 
trials assured by the First Amendment and recognized in Richmond 
Newspapers:  "By inspection of such transcripts, the public, 
usually through the press, can monitor, observe, and comment upon 
the activities of the judge and the judicial process."  Smith, 
787 F.2d at 115.  Under our guiding jurisprudence, "[t]he 
existence of a common law right of access to . . . inspect 
judicial records is beyond dispute."  Publicker Indus., Inc. v. 
Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1066-67 (3d Cir. 1984).  See, e.g. 
Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Technologies, Inc., 998 F.2d 
157 (3d Cir. 1993); Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. 
                     
17
.  "The right to inspect and copy [judicial records and 
transcripts] antedates the Constitution."  Criden I, 648 F.2d at 
819 (citation omitted). 
  
Corp., 949 F.2d 653 (3d Cir. 1991).  This strong presumption of 
access to records, including transcripts, provides independent 
support for the conclusion that the First Amendment right of 
access must extend equally to transcripts as to live proceedings.    
 2. 
 The government next contends that if, indeed, the 
sealing of the transcripts is to be considered a "closure" which 
is covered by a right of access, such closure was justified by 
compelling reasons.  Even were that so, we still would be 
required to reverse the order of the district court.  This is 
because at the time of the sealing, no findings were placed on 
the record.  Findings were not issued until December 9, 1993, 
nearly five months after the sealing occurred.  Under the 
procedure established in Press-Enterprise I and the subsequent 
right of access cases, closure may not be retroactively 
validated.  The court here did not satisfy its burden of placing 
findings on the record which clearly established that closure was 
necessary to protect an overriding interest.  On this basis 
alone, the order sealing the transcripts was improper.18  While 
                     
18
.  We note as well that this case raises important due process 
clause issues.  First, there was not even minimal notice and an 
opportunity to respond prior to the deprivation of the right of 
access.  And after the deprivation occurred and the press 
objected, asserting the right of access, there was a delay before 
a hearing was afforded.  In Raffoul, 826 F.2d at 224, this court 
held that the due process clause "prohibits exclusion of the 
press and public from a criminal trial without affording full and 
fair consideration to the public's interest in maintaining an 
open proceeding."  The court required that motions for closure be 
publicly docketed, that in camera motions be renewed in open 
court, and that a brief, pre-closure hearing be granted as a 
  
the district court revisited that order, unsealing the 
transcripts with limitations placed upon their use, that initial, 
improper action was not cured by the release of the transcript.  
See Simone 14 F.3d at 842.  Under Press-Enterprise I, the press 
had a right of access to the information, and as each day passed, 
(..continued) 
matter of right to those actually present in court before closure 
may be ordered.  In addition, "interested members of the press 
and public must be permitted a hearing within a reasonable time 
in order to move for access to sealed transcripts of a closed 
proceeding."  Id. at 225.  See also Criden II, 675 F.2d at 559 
(requiring that motions for closure of pretrial proceedings must 
be entered on docket sufficiently in advance of disposition to 
afford an opportunity for intervention and resistance). 
 Here, of course, the proceedings were not closed, so 
that closure began with the sealing of the transcripts.  Yet that 
distinction is not dispositive, for the right of access extends 
equally to transcripts as to proceedings.  See supra at __.  The 
logic of Raffoul suggests that the provision of some minimal 
notice and a limited opportunity for a hearing was incumbent upon 
the court before it could impose closure of its own motion.  It 
is axiomatic that, at a minimum, procedural due process requires 
that the deprivation of a protected interest be accompanied by 
notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time, and 
in a meaningful manner.  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267, 90 
S.Ct. 1011, 1020 (1970); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 
85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191 (1965); Raffoul, 826 F.2d at 222.  As Justice 
Powell observed in Gannett, Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 400-
01, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 2916 (concurring), 
 
 It is not enough . . . that the trial courts 
apply a certain standard to requests for 
closure.  If the constitutional right of the 
press and public is to have substance, 
representatives of these groups must be given 
an opportunity to be heard on the question of 
their exclusion. 
 
This passage was adopted by a Court majority in Globe Newspaper, 
457 U.S. at 609, n. 25, 102 S.Ct. at 2621.       
  
the information denied to the press and the public grew 
increasingly stale. 
 3. 
 The on-going effect of the initial lack of findings is 
a prime example of the correlation between substance and 
procedure.  In the First Amendment context, the procedural 
requisites to closure are crucial in order to protect against 
erroneous restrictions upon the right of access.19  Thus, the 
requirement that particularized findings of a compelling interest 
must be placed on the record before a hearing is closed or a 
record sealed is not only for the benefit of the reviewing court 
on appeal.  It exists, most fundamentally, to assure careful 
analysis by the district court before any limitation is imposed, 
because reversal on review cannot fully vindicate First Amendment 
rights. 
 Here, the lack of findings at the outset facilitated 
the delay in the unsealing of the transcript.  It is questionable 
whether the court's after-the-fact description of its reason for 
sealing the transcript pre-verdict--to protect the jury from 
outside influences during their deliberations20--is supported by 
                     
19
.  Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 343, 96 S.Ct. 
893, 903, 907 (1976)(finding the value of procedural safeguards 
to be a factor in determining what procedure is due to protect 
against the erroneous deprivation of liberty or property 
interests within the meaning of the due process clause). 
20
.  Antar, 839 F.Supp. at 300 ("[S]ealing the voir dire was 
necessary at that time to preclude any possibility of contact by 
the media during deliberations."). 
  
the record.  However, even if it were, that basis evaporated upon 
the return of a verdict.  By the court's own logic it should have 
unsealed the transcripts on July 20.  In fact, as early as August 
2, the court acknowledged, "I've accomplished my purpose.  
Absolutely."  Yet the court failed to unseal the documents.  
Under the First Amendment, once an overriding interest initially 
necessitating closure has passed, the restrictions must be 
lifted.21  Had the court clearly articulated its reasons for 
closure on the record, the passing of the purported exigency may 
have been more noticeable.22 
 The lack of findings also allowed the court to pass 
over the fact that, where a right of access exists, the proponent 
of closure bears a strong burden in rebutting the "presumption of 
                     
21
.  See Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole, 463 U.S. 1303, 
1306, 103 S.Ct. 3524, 3527 (1983)(Brennan, Circuit 
Justice)("Insofar as the State's interest is in shielding jurors 
from pressure during the course of a trial, so as to ensure the 
defendant a fair trial, that interest becomes attenuated after 
the jury brings in its verdict and is discharged."); In re Globe 
Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 91 (1st Cir. 1990)("[S]tronger 
reasons to withhold juror names and addresses will often exist 
during a trial than after a verdict is rendered.  After the 
verdict, release normally would seem less likely to harm the 
rights of the particular accuseds to a fair trial.). 
22
.  We indicate no judgment whether the court's post hoc 
justification, if offered as a finding before closure, would have 
been sufficiently evidenced to have satisfied the need for an 
"overriding interest."  In its December 9 opinion the court found 
that, despite counsel's assurance that he would not release the 
names and addresses of the jurors to the press before the 
verdict, the request was sufficient to raise a tangible threat to 
the purity of the jury's deliberations and sufficiently 
compelling to have permitted closure.  
  
openness."  Instead of recognizing that it bore the burden of 
justifying the original sealing order, as well as the decision to 
maintain the transcripts under seal, the court shifted the burden 
to the press to demonstrate to the court why the documents should 
be unsealed.23  In effect, once the court accomplished the 
sealing--without affording either the press or the public the 
procedural protections of findings, notice, or an opportunity to 
respond--it viewed the sealed status of the transcripts as the 
status quo.  From the record before us, the district judge 
appears not to have recognized that maintaining the transcripts 
under seal, though a passive act, was an active decision 
requiring justification under the First Amendment. 
 Moreover, not only must a court ordering closure 
establish that an overriding interest compels some limitation 
upon the right of access, but it must also ensure that the 
limitation imposed is the least restrictive means possible.  In 
determining what limitation is least restrictive, the court is 
justified in recognizing the countervailing need to protect the 
confidentiality of juror deliberations.  However, threats to that 
process must be actual and specific, not conclusory and generic.  
The court must articulate findings of the actual expectation of 
                     
23
.  Thus, the court warned that the press would bear "the 
laboring oar" with regard to any argument in favor of unsealing 
the transcripts.  In particular, the press would have to 
establish "what, if any news gathering or First Amendment 
arguments are sufficient to overcome the very sacred nature of a 
jury's deliberations" (emphasis added). 
  
an unwarranted intrusion upon juror deliberations or of a 
probability of harassment of jurors beyond what the jurors, 
rather than what a particular judge, may deem to be acceptable.    
 Unfortunately, the district court here failed to make 
the particularized findings which may sufficiently justify a 
limitation upon the right of access.  This allowed the district 
judge to rely upon his personal assessment of generalized, 
societal concerns. 
 4.   
 Compounding the problem of the late release of the 
transcript was the nature of the restrictions, placed upon the 
press's use of juror information, in the absence of findings that 
jurors were being harassed or that a threat of undue harassment 
was impending.24  As noted above, there is substantial debate 
about the value of post-verdict interviews.  Supra note 8.  The 
benefits of access and of public awareness of the duties and 
obligations of the jury process are weighed against concerns that 
courts may become carnivals, that jurors may be reluctant to 
serve in future cases if they fear their comments in the jury 
room will be repeated later by their fellow jurors for broadcast 
to the public, and that public knowledge of the factors behind a 
verdict may undermine respect for the process.  
                     
24
.  We deal with the issue here under the circumstance that the 
restrictions were imposed five months after the conclusion of the 
trial.  We realize of course that the result we reach here might 
not be appropriate in all aspects were the district court dealing 
with restrictions on juror contacts at the immediate close of a 
widely publicized trial. 
  
 Though an interesting debate, generalized social claims 
should not bear upon a decision whether limitations should be 
placed upon the press's ability to have post-trial access to 
jurors.  Here, for example, the court's concern with harassment 
was hypothetical, as there was no evidence, or even allegation, 
of misbehavior by the press.25  In fact, both in the initial 
letter to the court requesting the juror's names and at the 
October 18 hearing, the press suggested that, upon the court's 
agreement, they would interview those jurors who were willing 
after the verdict in a separate room at the courthouse, so as to 
allow the court to supervise and to minimize any potential for 
disturbing the jurors at their homes.  Of course, where evidence 
of harassment does exist, it is unquestionable that the court has 
both the power, as well as the duty, to prevent it.  In re News-
Express Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 810 (5th cir. 1982); United States 
v. Doherty, 675 F.Supp. 719, 724 (D. Mass. 1987).   
 Moreover, in the present case, because there is not a 
sufficient record of the immediacy of juror harassment by the 
press, we are unable to determine whether there may have been 
viable alternatives to the limitations imposed on juror contacts 
after the transcripts were unsealed.  The district court was 
correct to be concerned about the potential negative effect of 
                     
25
.  The closest thing to factual support for a finding of a 
potential for harassment is the court's observation of what it 
called a "truism"-- that "reporters are persistent and tenacious 
in pursuing information."  839 F.Supp. at 303 (citation omitted).   
  
disclosures by former jurors upon the freedom and candor of 
deliberations in future cases.  And though this may not suffice 
to restrict the right of access to voir dire transcripts, it does 
not mean that other avenues of recourse are unavailable.  In 
particular, the district court has the discretion to discuss 
press contacts with the jury at the end of a trial; to emphasize 
to the jurors the importance of maintaining the confidentiality 
of jury deliberations in order to promote frank discussion during 
those deliberations; to assure jurors that the court will protect 
them from harassment by the press; to provide, if necessary, a 
neutral area where the press can interview the jurors; and to 
remind the jurors of the value of their service and the crucial 
role that trust and confidentiality among jurors plays in the 
fulfillment of their duty.  See, e.g., Globe Newspaper, 920 F.2d 
at 93-94 ("It has . . . been a common and, we believe, wise 
custom for trial judges to advise jurors . . . that they not only 
are free to refuse to disclose what went on in the jury room, but 
that they may well think it better and more prudent to decline to 
discuss what occurred.").  Such comments from the bench, though 
cautionary in nature, are thoughtfully received by jurors who 
generally accept their role with the seriousness it is due.   
 Turning to the specific restrictions imposed here, we 
will affirm the first, that no juror is obliged, or may be 
compelled, to grant an interview.  This restriction is consistent 
with the advice long given to jurors concerning post-trial press 
  
contacts.  We conclude, however, that the second and third 
prohibitions, against "repeated" juror contacts and against any 
attempt to resume a juror interview after a juror expresses a 
desire to conclude it, cannot stand in the absence of any finding 
by the court that harassing or intrusive interviews are occurring 
or are intended.  The existing or threatened basis for such 
restrictions must be present before they are imposed.  
Furthermore, even if sufficient basis for imposing these 
restrictions did exist, it is not certain that, in the absence of 
the consideration of alternatives, they would have been the least 
restrictive means available to the court.   
 The fourth prohibition, forbidding inquiry into the 
"specific votes, statements, opinions or other comments" of any 
other juror, encompasses in part the provision in the Handbook 
for Trial Jurors, "the court may enter an order in a specific 
case that during any such [post-trial] interview, jurors may not 
give any information with respect to the vote of any other 
juror."  Handbook at 11 (emphasis added).  The Handbook provision 
is directed at "specific" cases, not all cases.  We cannot 
ascertain after the fact whether the fourth restriction, in its 
broader form, was necessary one year ago under the circumstances 
of this specific case.  We will not vacate it because such a 
restriction is appropriate in certain specific cases.  We are 
troubled, however, by the lack of explanation for its imposition 
here.  When in a specific future case the district court may 
  
determine to impose a similar restriction, our appellate review 
would be assisted if the district court were to give an 
explanation for the necessity of the restriction. 
  IV. 
 In closing, we acknowledge the weight of the district 
court's concerns.  However, we conclude that restrictions on 
post-trial interviews must reflect an impending threat of jury 
harassment rather than a generalized misgiving about the wisdom 
of such interviews.  For the foregoing reasons, the order of the 
district court will be reversed as to the original sealing order 
and as to that part of the unsealing order which comprises the 
second and third restrictions on juror contacts by the press.  We 
will affirm the district court's imposition of the first and 
fourth restrictions. 
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ROSENN, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 This case marks another effort by the press to test the 
outer limits of their right to gather and print news about all 
aspects of the judicial system and implicates the historic 
efforts of the courts to protect the confidentiality of a jury's 
deliberative process.  Our decision today recognizes the right of 
press access to the courts, including the right to interview 
jurors, but we reaffirm that this right is not absolute.  The 
press' right to interview jurors is separated by a delicate but 
important line between the permissible and the impermissible.  We 
attempt to draw that line in this case. 
 I write separately, however, to express my deep concern 
that the court, by its opinion, may be announcing conflicting and 
confusing standards with respect to the findings a district court 
must make before invoking closure during a criminal trial.  
Moreover, the court's opinion unnecessarily requires post-trial 
factual findings before a trial court can attempt to guide the 
press and jurors over the dangerous shoals that must be carefully 
navigated whenever jurors are interviewed after a verdict.   
 A. 
 In this modern era, federal trial courts are confronted 
with increasingly complex cases in both civil and criminal 
  
trials.  The trials are often complicated by intricate procedural 
rules, lengthy discovery, and time-consuming collateral issues.  
In a lengthy, nationally covered, high-profile criminal 
proceeding, such as this case, the trial judge's attempts to 
control and protect the integrity of the judicial process are 
challenging and fraught with deep risks.  An appellate court, 
therefore, should refrain from burdening the trial court with 
unnecessary and exacting findings regarding collateral matters.   
 The court commences its opinion with a standard that 
requires specific findings before a trial court may order closure 
so that a reviewing court can determine whether the trial court 
properly entered a closure order.  The Supreme Court of the 
United States announced this standard in 1984 and this court 
followed it until today.  Now, however, the court expands the 
standard by requiring the judge to make "detailed" (Maj. Op. at 
5) and "individualized" (Maj. Op. at 27) findings before 
effecting closure.  More troubling is the requirement that the 
findings "clearly" establish that the closure was necessary to 
protect an overriding interest.  (Maj. Op. at 32). 
 I see no difference between the specificity of findings 
necessary to determine whether closure is justified and the 
findings required in any other dispositive aspect of a judicial 
proceeding.  Trial court findings must be sufficient to enable a 
reviewing court to ascertain the basis and validity of the trial 
court's questioned ruling.  No greater purpose or burden attaches 
  
to findings because they are made in a proceeding involving First 
Amendment issues.  This is demonstrated in Press-Enterprise Co. 
v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501 (1984), (Press-
Enterprise I) where the Court discussed the quality of the 
findings necessary to overcome the presumption of openness and 
justify closure.  The Court stated that the threatened interest 
must be articulated with findings "specific enough that a 
reviewing court can determine whether the closure was properly 
ordered."  Id. at 510.  The Court reiterated that standard two 
years later in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 
1, 13 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II).  The Court required no more.  
 One year later, the press complained in United States 
v. Raffoul, 826 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1987), that the district court 
did not articulate reasons for closure with sufficient 
specificity.  Citing Press Enterprise I, this court adhered to 
the standard of specific findings enunciated in that case.  More 
recently in United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 840 (3d Cir. 
1994), this court determined that a party's First Amendment right 
of access applied to post-trial examination of jurors for 
potential misconduct.  We therefore considered the sufficiency of 
the district court's findings to justify restriction of that 
right.  Again, the court relied on the specific findings standard 
referred to in Press Enterprise I.  I see no reason in this case 
to depart from the standard we followed in Raffoul and Simone.  
Nothing here justifies a higher, more burdensome standard.  Yet, 
  
the court's opinion today enhances the specific findings 
standard.  By requiring that the trial court's findings "clearly" 
establish that closure was necessary to protect an overriding 
interest, the court puts us uncomfortably close to the clear and 
convincing standard of proof required to establish fraud.  The 
additional findings now required can only lead to troublesome 
problems by requiring a trial court to calibrate its findings. 
 B. 
 With respect to the sensitive area of post-verdict 
interrogation of jurors, the trial court was justifiably 
concerned with the unsupervised behavior of a zealous and 
aggressive press in these "high-profile prosecutions for 
securities fraud, RICO conspiracy, mail fraud, and related 
charges."  The courts traditionally have worried about protecting 
the secrecy of a jury's deliberations because of the substantial 
danger of embarrassing, harassing, or intimidating a juror.  This 
case took approximately seven weeks to try and required more than 
six days of jury deliberations.  Understandably, the trial judge 
was gravely concerned with preserving the integrity of the trial 
proceedings, the confidentiality of the jury's deliberations and 
the thought processes of the individual jurors. 
 Under these circumstances, the trial court ultimately 
ordered the unsealing of the voir dire transcripts and the judge 
imposed certain limitations regarding the manner in which post-
verdict interviews were to be conducted in order to protect the 
  
jurors' privacy and in the interest of maintaining the secrecy of 
the jury deliberative process.  The judge wrote each of the 
former jurors a letter informing them of his unsealing order and 
the consequent disclosure of the jurors' names and hometowns.  
The court informed them that they might be contacted by the media 
and explained their role in the justice system and the tradition 
of secrecy accorded jury deliberations.  The judge was obviously 
motivated by the long recognized view of the courts that "freedom 
of deliberative thought is central to the institution of trial by 
jury and that this freedom is endangered almost as seriously by 
the prospect of post-trial disclosure as it is by the presence of 
spectators in the jury room."  Note, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 905 (1982-
83).   
 The trial judge further advised the jurors that in 
issuing his order unsealing the public record, he had included 
the following guidelines to be followed by anyone seeking a juror 
interview: 
 (a)  no juror is under any obligation to 
grant an interview nor may any juror be 
compelled to do so; 
 
 (b)  repeated requests of a juror for an 
interview by any person or any associate of 
that person are strictly prohibited; 
 
 (c)  once a juror expresses a desire to 
conclude an interview already in progress, 
the interviewer must immediately cease all 
questioning; 
 
 (d)  although . . . free to discuss any 
aspect of the case, [a juror] should be aware 
that no one may ask about the specific vote, 
  
statement, opinion, thoughts or comments of 
any juror other than [him/herself]. 
 
 As the court notes today, the first limitation is 
consistent with "the routine instructions" customarily given to 
jurors in the federal system.  As an "instruction" or guideline, 
no findings are required before it is given.  The court also 
notes that the fourth limitation directed to maintaining the 
confidentiality of the jury deliberations is, like the first, 
consistent with the provisions of the federal Handbook for Trial 
Jurors.  The Handbook instructs the jurors that "the court may 
enter an order in a specific case that during any [post-verdict] 
interview, jurors may not give any information with respect to 
the vote of any other juror."  Again, the Handbook does not 
require the district court to make any findings before it gives 
this instruction.  In fact, the judge acknowledged the limited 
effect of this instruction when, during discussion of the 
contents of his proposed letter to the jurors, he informed 
counsel that "[i]f a juror freely chooses to disclose such 
information, so be it."  United States v. Antar, 839 F. Supp. 
283, 305 (D. N.J. 1993). 
 In its second and third instructions, the court may 
have been excessively cautious in its effort to protect the 
jurors from harassment, embarrassment, or intimidation.  The 
problem with the second instruction is that more than one or two 
requests may be made of a juror, depending upon the nuance, tone, 
and language of the interviewer, without harassing the juror.  
  
This instruction also disregards the possibility that each juror 
may have a different tolerance for harassment.  Therefore, the 
language of this instruction is arbitrary and inflexible.   
 The third instruction does not allow for a situation 
where a juror may express a desire which is tentative or 
indecisive.  This instruction does not give an interviewer a 
reasonable amount of latitude.  Had the court limited its 
instructions to forbidding the interviewers from harassing, 
embarrassing, or intimidating a juror, the instructions would 
have been consistent with the concerns expressed by the Supreme 
Court and reflected in Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b).  However, 
the instructions actually given here unduly limited the 
perimeters of a reasonably permissible interview. 
 In United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1978), 
the court of appeals considered an application for permission to 
conduct post-verdict juror interviews.  The court observed that 
"the proper functioning of the jury system requires that the 
court protect jurors from being 'harassed and beset by the 
defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence . . . to 
set aside the verdict.'"  Id. at 664 (citing McDonald v. Pless, 
238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915)).  In addition, the court recognized 
that certain limits on post-trial inquiry into jury verdicts are 
necessary in the interest of finality.  Id.  There is also a 
danger, noted in Moten, that some jurors instead of feeling 
harassed, might revel in the attention of a post-trial interview, 
  
especially if interviewed by the national press or media, and 
disclose secrets or express misgivings, lingering doubts, or even 
complaints about fellow jurors.  This might lead jurors to 
"imagin[e] sinister happenings which simply did not occur or [to] 
say[] things which . . . would serve only to decrease public 
confidence in verdicts."  Id. at 665.  The court, therefore, 
concluded that supervision of interviews is desirable, not only 
to protect jurors from harassment, but also to insure that the 
inquiry does not range beyond subjects permissible for juror 
testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). 
 The notes of the Advisory Committee with respect to 
Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) support the district court's concern in this 
case.   
 The mental operations and emotional reactions 
of the jurors in arriving at a given result 
would, if allowed as a subject of inquiry, 
place every verdict at the mercy of jurors 
and invite tampering and harassment. 
   
 * * * * * 
 
 Under the federal decisions the central focus 
has been upon insulation of the manner in 
which the jury reached its verdict, and this 
protection extends to each of the components 
of deliberation, including arguments, 
statements, discussions, mental and emotional 
reactions, votes, and any other feature of 
the process. 
 
28 U.S.C.A. § 606(b). 
 
 I agree that the second and third instructions are an 
overstatement of the law which could unduly hamper a journalist 
  
in an appropriate interview.  I reach this conclusion, not 
because there is an "absence of any finding by the court that 
harassing or intrusive interviews are occurring," (Maj. Op. at 
39) but because the limitations imposed by the court had the 
effect of forbidding permissible inquiries that may not reach the 
point of harassment, embarrassment, or intimidation.  In giving 
instructions on unsupervised interviews of jurors, findings are 
not only unnecessary and burdensome, but potentially impossible 
because the interviews will be conducted in the future.  We must 
bear in mind that the confidentiality of the thought processes of 
jurors, their privileged exchange of views, and the freedom to be 
candid in their deliberations are the soul of the jury system.  
This interaction must be zealously guarded from any impermissible 
encroachment if the system is to survive.  If there is any 
material error of law in a court's instruction to the jurors, the 
injured party may obtain relief from the appellate court, as it 
did here.   
 Because I agree that the court erred in issuing  
instructions 2 and 3, I concur. 
